Kasparov: Ukraine victory needed for any real change in Russia

Garry Kasparov, a leading Russian opposition figure and former world chess champion, said that Ukraine's victory is a necessary precondition for any meaningful political change in Russia. Without Moscow's defeat, the country's current regime and imperial system will remain intact, he argues.
The Russian antiwar opposition today is largely in exile. It is far from unified — the main divide runs along the question of how much support to give Ukraine. In an interview with ERR, Garry Kasparov spoke about how, in his view, the current Russian authorities can be weakened and how Ukraine's victory can be brought closer.
Three years ago, you told me in an interview that the basic criterion for defining a "good Russian" should be agreement with the formula "the war is criminal, the regime is illegitimate, Crimea is Ukraine." At the time, you estimated that about 25% of Russian émigrés were willing to sign on to these views. Has that proportion changed now?
It has probably grown somewhat, but I'm still not sure we're a majority. The situation is dynamic — it's changing. But this is the first and necessary step, and it's codified in the Berlin Declaration1. The document is longer, of course, but it boils down to this triad: the war is criminal, the regime is illegitimate, Crimea is Ukrainian. It's important to note that a significant portion of people who consider themselves part of the Russian democratic opposition still haven't signed it. They say various things — "we don't like this," "this is Khodorkovsky's project," and so on. But we understand that they simply cannot bring themselves to agree that Crimea is Ukrainian, to recognize Ukraine's sovereignty, and to accept that this is not just Putin's war, but Russia's war.
One can discuss the reasons for this attitude: some hope to take part in future Russian elections, others are fundamentally unwilling to cross that line. The same goes for the flag. For me, someone who believes the Russian tricolor can be rehabilitated is on the other side of the barricades, no matter what rhetoric they use. I myself played under the tricolor back in 1990. Back then it was a revolutionary, anti-imperial flag. But in reality it was anti-Soviet, not anti-imperial. And our Free Russia Forum believes it's time to move from the Berlin Declaration to the Strasbourg one. The Strasbourg Declaration says those who want change in Russia must fight on Ukraine's side.
Fight — literally? Not just support Ukraine rhetorically, but actually join the Ukrainian armed forces?
There are many ways to fight. I've raised enough money for Ukraine that I believe I've made my contribution. War is not fought only on the battlefield. I lobbied for the military aid bill to Ukraine that Republicans in Congress were blocking at Trump's urging even under Biden. Our American organization raised $15 million in aid for Ukraine. The latest $2 million package was delivered to Kyiv and Kharkiv a month ago.
But there is also political assistance. And here the stance of the Russian antiwar opposition is crucial. This is exactly where the dividing line runs: do we consider Ukraine's victory a necessary condition for any potential change in Russia? There is no room for compromise on this. I see no way to reach agreement with those who keep talking about a "beautiful future Russia" while avoiding the central issue. The main problem is Russia's war in Ukraine. Without its end — which would lead to the collapse of the Putin regime and of the empire — nothing in Russia can change.
But the émigré community itself needs support; how can it help others? There were hopes that the Platform of Russian Democratic Forces at PACE, established this year, would unite opposition-minded émigrés and somehow help them. You've joined this platform — have you been able to influence anything yet?
Some influence, but not much. Because a significant part of the Russian opposition still sticks to pacifist positions. And it is precisely this group that receives most of the grants, both European and American. The same people receive grants, and the same people distribute them. They are interested in continuing to sell the myth that we need to "work inside Russia." But there is no work inside Russia! All talk about influencing the Russian population is nothing more than a PR campaign to secure more grants — so that those who funded such efforts 10–20 years ago can continue supporting what is now an émigré circle.
So what do you propose?
A possible solution would be creating a "Russian Taiwan." This is not about charity — it's part of a broader plan in our struggle against the Putin regime. Of course we must help Ukraine — militarily, financially, politically. But we can also weaken Putin. The weakest point of Putin's war machine today is its brains: engineers, programmers, financiers — people who perform key functions as cogs in the system. Russia has been hit with 20 sanctions packages.
If the real aim had been to inflict serious damage on its economy, it could have been done in two. Remember the last horrific attack on Kyiv? I read a report saying the ballistic missiles used were manufactured in 2026 using Western components. Everyone understands that Putin's system of circumventing sanctions works quite effectively. And the so-called Russian antiwar opposition has obstructed the "Russian Taiwan" plan because it would undermine their "grant base."
What do you mean by "Russian Taiwan"?
A person willing to sign a declaration recognizing Ukraine's territorial integrity, calling the Putin regime illegitimate and criminal, and ready to integrate into the free world would have a real opportunity to break with that regime. I understand not everyone can leave Russia. But even if it's just a million people — people critically important to Putin's war machine — if they were given the chance to leave and live normal lives elsewhere, I'm not sure Putin could continue the war at all. I've told my American friends: if you had had the option in 1942 to offer visas to German engineers, would you have done it? The answer is obviously yes. So what has changed now?
But there is strong resistance from Western bureaucracy — "too many Russians will come." Visas are supposedly restricted, but more than half a million have still been issued, so infiltration2 continues. Look at the Venice Biennale — despite protests, they still proceed, and Putin's money clears the way. What I propose is an attempt to reverse this trend and inflict real damage. This is the dividing line between us and those who refuse to recognize that the war in Ukraine is the key factor shaping potential change in Russia. "Russian Taiwan" would be an ally of Ukraine. Meanwhile, our liberal opposition living off European grants continues to hold back efforts to create a pro-Ukrainian coalition willing to fight alongside Ukraine.
Perhaps they don't want to be pro-Ukrainian because they are pro-Russian — they want a different Russia, not Putin's Russia. Why should they focus on Ukraine?
Because today Russia is waging a criminal war and committing genocide. Let's take World War II as an analogy. One could say "we are not against Germany, we are against Hitler." But in reality, you had to fight Germany, German troops; you had to bomb German cities. The position you describe today is shameful and cowardly — especially since there is no real resistance inside Russia. In Nazi Germany, hundreds of thousands were in concentration camps. Today we speak of about five thousand political prisoners in Russia.
Yes, they are prisoners, but there is virtually no conscious resistance. Perhaps a few dozen people went to prison knowingly opposing the war, understanding the consequences. The scale of rejection of the regime in Nazi Germany and in today's Russia is incomparable. When people say, "we don't want to participate in a war where Russians are being killed," I reply: aggressors are being killed. It doesn't matter whether they are Buryats, Tuvans, or Russians from depressed regions — this is an army of aggressors. If we want change in Russia, we must ensure Ukraine wins and Russia loses. As long as the imperial system of governance remains, nothing will change.
Three years ago I asked whether you hoped to return to Russia, and you confidently said "yes." But if your "Russian Taiwan" idea is realized, wouldn't that mean émigrés would need to put down roots abroad, and any new Russia — if it emerges — would be seen only by their children or grandchildren?
Actually, it's the opposite. If we follow the logic of those grant recipients, then only grandchildren can hope. Our chance of return is tied to radical change. It's not about whether the ruler is good or bad, whether Putin stays or goes, whether there's a coup or assassination. It's about dismantling the imperial system. We now understand that in 1991 we failed to solve the core problem. The main virus wasn't communism — communism was layered onto centuries-old imperialism.
So only defeat in war and a Ukrainian flag over Sevastopol can convince the average Russian that the empire is dead, and that the main issue then becomes China. China is a claimant to Russian territory in the Far East and Eastern Siberia — about 1.5 million square kilometers that imperial Russia took in 1860. China hasn't forgotten. So Russia's future — if it has one — will not be within its current borders. "Russian Taiwan" could become a project of Russia's rehabilitation.
What do you mean?
Imagine we have this million young people. I'm 63; Khodorkovsky is nearly 63. We left long ago — we can propose ideas. But younger people must implement them. Suppose things begin to change — where is the new elite, the technocratic layer capable of carrying out reforms? "Russian Taiwan" could serve as that base. It may sound like fantasy, but at least it's a plan. Everything else is an attempt to freeze the status quo. We propose something that could potentially bring change. Dreaming of a "beautiful future Russia" while living off Western grants is a dead end.
But increasingly people are talking about freezing hostilities along the front line as a possible scenario. No one seems to speak of Russia's defeat anymore.
The war is the key source of legitimacy for Putin's regime. It might slow down, but it won't end, because Putin is not only — and not primarily — fighting Ukraine, but the West. As long as Putin remains in power and the imperial system persists, the war will continue in one form or another. Ukraine, with its blood and sacrifice, has shielded Europe — including Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Ukraine is saving Europe from Putin's horde. Putin's goals haven't changed: to push NATO back to its 1997 borders.
The war may slow if Russia runs short of resources, but Putin will rebuild and attack again. In this war, either Putin wins or we do — there is no third option. It's more comparable to World War I than to World War II: Germany capitulated while its troops were still in France and Belgium because it ran out of resources. The same logic applies here — we must minimize Putin's military potential. The West talks a lot about supporting Ukraine, but as a chess player I'll say this: first you define a strategic goal, then you marshal resources. The goal of dismantling the Russian empire has not yet been set.
1 A declaration signed in Berlin in 2023 by representatives of the Russian antiwar and democratic movement — ed. note.
2 Pro-Putin agents — ed. note.
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Editor: Karin Koppel, Argo Ideon












