Russia's relations with China have, on the surface, appeared to strengthen since the former's full-scale aggression against Ukraine. In reality, however, Russia has become increasingly dependent on China. When Vladimir Putin once declared that the relationship between the two countries was "limitless," the phrase can be interpreted in multiple ways. One of those meanings concerns literal borders and the crossing of them, referring specifically to China's growing influence, especially in the Russian Far East. And not just influence: the physical presence of Chinese nationals is also increasing.

At the end of 2022, the president of Taiwan remarked that if China is truly interested in restoring historical territory, it should focus on reclaiming the land occupied by Russia, rather than Taiwan. It's not that China's current leadership has forgotten history. Quite the contrary — they remember well that the 1858 Treaty of Aigun forced China to cede about 600,000 square kilometers of land to Tsarist Russia. This area includes what is now Amur Oblast and parts of Khabarovsk Krai. China was weak at the time and, in fact, its losses were even greater.

In 2023, China's Ministry of Ecology and Environment issued a regulation requiring maps to display the names of Russian Far Eastern cities, including Vladivostok, in their historical Chinese versions. Chinese school textbooks also note that roughly one million square kilometers of Chinese territory remain under Russian control.

Chinese nationalists have openly demanded that the territories seized by Russia during the Qing Dynasty be returned. Beijing has not made any loud public claims, but for some time now, there has been a quiet infiltration of China into Russia's Far East. The Russian language has even adopted a term for it: kitaizatsiya, or "Sinicization," referring to the growing Chinese cultural, economic and political influence within Russia.

As Russia's population declines, many regions, particularly in the Far East, are experiencing a demographic vacuum. And as nature abhors a vacuum, this space is being filled, on one hand, by an influx of Central Asian migrants and, on the other, by a growing number of Chinese. While 2022 may have made the Chinese somewhat more cautious, the overall trend has remained steady.

It is now believed that in many areas, the combined numbers of Central Asian laborers and Chinese residents already surpass the local Russian population. This shouldn't be surprising when one considers, for instance, that Primorsky Krai, which includes Vladivostok, has a population of around two million, while across the border in China's Heilongjiang Province, there are over 38 million people.

The Chinese are valued throughout the Russian Far East and Russia more broadly for their industriousness. Interestingly, surveys show that many wealthy Russians have started hiring Chinese nannies, who are now the second-most popular choice after French ones.

Intermarriage between local Russian women and Chinese men is also increasingly common in the Far East. Children in these families predominantly grow up identifying as Chinese. For example, in the Jewish Autonomous Oblast, estimates suggest that just 10,000 Chinese nationals acquiring Russian citizenship could lead to Chinese becoming the majority population within 10 to 15 years. Currently, the region has about 144,000 inhabitants and it is said that there are already more Chinese living there than Jews — the group for whom the oblast is named.

This autonomy is one of the regions that has drawn particular attention from China. In 2024, the local economy grew by 4.4 percent, and this had nothing to do with Moscow. As early as 2012, the then-governor, Vinnikov, noted that the region's economy was more closely tied to China than to Russia. Since 2022, China's share of the local economy has risen to 98.6 percent. The reason is simple: the oblast contains more than 20 valuable natural resources, including graphite, talc, gold, phosphates, diamonds, platinum and coal, among others.

Another region of interest to China is the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia). In September of last year, Sakha signed a cooperation agreement with an association of Chinese companies operating in Russia. China has become one of Sakha's main foreign partners, accounting for 45 percent of the republic's foreign trade. Local residents have begun favoring China for their vacation travel and the number of Chinese tourists is rapidly increasing.

When it comes to Sakha, Beijing emphasizes the fact that it is the second-largest territory inhabited by the "yellow race," after China. In other words, there is a racial kinship. However, China prefers to exercise soft power in the region. As a result, interest in learning Chinese has grown rapidly. In 33 Sakha schools, Chinese is now taught as the first foreign language. Moreover, Beijing seems to view its growing presence as a way to help increase Sakha's independence from Moscow.

The third and perhaps most contentious region is the Republic of Tuva, whose Buddhist identity makes it something of a buffer between Russia, Mongolia and China. Moscow is trying hard to keep the republic economically dependent, mainly through financial support from the center. But Chinese influence there is undeniable.

Notably, former defense minister and longtime Putin loyalist Sergei Shoigu hails from Tuva. It's also worth noting that major lithium deposits have been discovered there. This forms part of Vladimir Putin's offer to the Americans to jointly mine rare earth minerals. Cooperation with the U.S. could potentially help keep China at bay. At the same time, Moscow has expressed interest in acquiring Chinese technology for processing these resources. Local authorities in Tuva, however, have openly stated that their foreign economic priorities are Kazakhstan, Mongolia and China.

Across Russia more broadly, there is growing concern about China's influence, even if that concern is rarely voiced publicly due to the country's growing dependence on Beijing. China restricts the export of certain advanced technologies to Russia, while extracting Russian military technology to study and adapt it for its own use. Chinese vehicles have largely displaced domestic Russian models, China sends spies to Russia and the list goes on.

Despite grand rhetoric, overall trade between Russia and China actually declined sharply last year. Chinese assistance to Russia in the Ukraine war may have increased, but on the whole, Russia is increasingly becoming a raw materials appendage of China. And China may simply be waiting for the fruit to ripen and fall into its lap in the form of the Russian Far East.

That this is understood even in Moscow is illustrated by Rosneft head Igor Sechin's admission that Russia has become China's "energy rice bowl," which Beijing holds in its hands and which Moscow must keep filling with oil and gas.

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