Finance Minister Jürgen Ligi [Reform] recently claimed in a Facebook post that Estonia ranks at the top in Europe for cultural spending, calling concerns about underfunding "declarative" and "empty." His argument relied on a Eurostat chart.

The problem is, the chart doesn't show what the minister claims. And when political messaging rests on faulty comparisons, functional solutions become impossible. Eurostat doesn't measure cultural strength — it tracks public property maintenance.

Eurostat's culture category doesn't reflect the vitality of a sector. It simply shows how much the general government spends. In Estonia, that means something very different than in the Nordic or Western European countries.

Here, most cultural and sports infrastructure is state- or municipally owned. So cultural expenses include building repairs, heating, electricity, depreciation, payroll, maintenance and capital costs. These are infrastructure upkeep, not cultural content. Elsewhere in Europe, these are treated separately. That's why Estonia appears to be a "big spender" on charts, while in reality, content funding is low by European standards.

So how do other countries handle it and why can't their numbers be compared to Estonia's?

To understand why Estonia looks like an overinvestor, we need to examine countries like Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark and Switzerland — nations with stronger cultural sectors in practice, yet more modest statistics.

NORWAY: The state funds culture, not utility bills.

Norway offers the clearest contrast to Estonia. While the state or municipality may own the building, it usually doesn't manage it. Cultural infrastructure is typically operated by foundations or private trusts, which manage costs, seek sponsorship, handle private and community funding and bear economic responsibility. Only programmatic and strategic contributions appear in the national accounts, not daily building costs like heat, electricity, repairs or depreciation.

In Estonia, all such costs are reflected in government budgets. As a result, statistics balloon, content funding shrinks and infrastructure spending eats away at cultural value. In Norway, it's the opposite: the numbers may look small, but actual content funding is significantly higher.

The simple truth is that Norway pays for culture; Estonia pays for buildings.

THE NETHERLANDS: Partnership over upkeep.

The Dutch widely use public–private partnerships. The government may fund construction, but operation is handled by private companies or foundations who assume both the risks and potential profits. The state supports artistic content — not utilities or repairs. As a result, Eurostat shows modest spending, but Dutch venues thrive on self-generated income and private support.

DENMARK: Community-based model, clear roles.

In Denmark, theaters and cultural centers are typically run by community foundations, nonprofits or trusts. The state funds content, local governments support regional roles and infrastructure is managed by private or community operators.

SWITZERLAND: Decentralized model, strong self-financing.

Most Swiss cultural infrastructure falls under cantonal or municipal control, with operations handled by private foundations, nonprofits or cultural enterprises. The national government supports content and high-impact national programs, not daily building expenses.

Summary of international examples: In all four countries, the state primarily supports content. Infrastructure costs are excluded from national cultural budgets, operators are non-governmental and the statistics do not reflect the full amount of money flowing into the sector. In Estonia, the opposite is true: the government maintains large building stock, cultural expenses are inflated by heating and electric bills, content funding is sidelined and statistics create the illusion of being "a European leader" while core funding remains insufficient.

When a state provides more content support — like in Norway, the Netherlands or Denmark — an institution's entire budget grows, because its programs can attract additional funding. But when the state focuses mostly on building maintenance, core content funding remains low, self-generated income stays stagnant and the institution's overall budget stays small.

Administrative costs are dead weight: they don't serve audiences, generate revenue or build partnerships. Content activities, on the other hand, create ticket sales, private investment, sponsorship and collaboration.

Another key difference is flexibility. When rising overhead is automatically covered by the state, it creates a political illusion that culture is already "well funded" because the total expenses are increasing. In systems where public money supports content, the funding can be used far more flexibly.

Estonia has 92 theaters, but no funding model supports such a fragmented system. And we must have the courage to say an uncomfortable truth out loud. That is an exceptionally high number for a country with a small population, a limited audience base, a regional market and a rapidly changing theater economy. Only a small portion of these theaters receive state support and even among them, the competition for funding has become painfully intense. Committee members are under pressure, theaters feel they are being treated unequally and internal tensions within the sector are growing.

Estonia may simply have too many theaters for the current funding model. That doesn't mean any one theater is unnecessary — it means not all can or should operate under the same national model.

European experience shows that the sector functions best when large, nationally significant theaters get stable base support, regional players receive flexible aid and smaller or innovative theaters shift toward a private model where state support amplifies their capacity to attract private funding. That's the goal of a new private capital fund Estonia is building: to bring private investment into culture and sports, match private funds with public ones, support growth in stronger private theaters and reduce dependence on short-term grant rounds.

Culture doesn't need protection through Excel spreadsheets. It needs honest accounting.

Minister Ligi's use of the Eurostat chart to argue that Estonia is among "Europe's top cultural spenders" rests on false assumptions. COFOG (Classification of the Functions of Government) doesn't measure quality or content investment; it reflects public expenditure structures. Estonia's model inflates stats because the state is both owner and operator.

What's worse, the minister criticizing culture's grasp of Excel runs a ministry where Excel itself doesn't work.

The €137 million car tax revenue projection, which ended up collecting about €70 million, isn't an exception; it follows the same pattern seen in excise taxes, gambling levies and other models that ignore consumer behavior. These aren't outliers, they're just the clearest examples.

An independent audit of the finance ministry's forecasting system would likely reveal methodological flaws — missing behavioral economics, wrong coefficients, outdated assumptions and flawed baselines carried over year after year.

When policy is built on false assumptions, bad policy follows. And when statistics are misused, the consequences fall on everyone. So the real question is: whose Excel isn't working — the cultural sector's or the finance ministry's?

In conclusion. Estonia's culture isn't overfunded — it's overmeasured and misinterpreted. The sector doesn't need fewer theaters or more concrete. It needs a new model: fairer, more effective and internationally viable.

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