I came to Kyiv from the front to talk to you about the war and the military, but here I discovered that the main topic in Ukraine right now is corruption at the highest levels of power. How might this corruption scandal affect the situation on the front?

Obviously, the scandal has a negative impact. It demoralizes both society and the armed forces. In the 11th year of war, while some are out there fighting, sacrificing their lives and health year after year, others in Kyiv or elsewhere are helping themselves to theft. That's treason. Corruption exists in every country. It exists in the United States and in fairly significant amounts. It probably exists in your country, too. And unfortunately, Ukraine is no exception — we have corruption as well. There is low-level corruption, mid-level corruption and high-level corruption.

The problem is that the country is going through a difficult time. We are heading into the hardest winter of the war. A large portion of our energy infrastructure has been destroyed. Our people on the front lines are extremely tired and worn out. Our society is deeply demoralized. And at such a moment, corruption at the highest level is exposed — among those close to the president who is the commander-in-chief and the international symbol of Ukraine. That is a serious problem.

Is Ukraine a country where corrupt officials end up in prison, rather than just stepping down from their positions of power?

Whether there are arrests is a big question. Many of the accused have, miraculously, already left Ukraine. We don't know whether they'll be caught or not. But if you're asking whether corrupt officials in Ukraine are being sent to prison, the answer is yes — practically every month.

Are there colonels and generals who have been charged and are in pretrial detention? Yes and that's happening right now. There are also oligarchs in prison.

So, yes, Ukraine is fighting corruption. But the problem is that this summer, we saw the president's office try to significantly restrict and essentially dismantle independent anti-corruption agencies. And a few months later, we're seeing a huge scandal involving the very same names. And this isn't the end of the scandal, these are just the first steps. We don't know what's coming next or whose names will emerge.

The military is currently one of the most trusted institutions among Ukrainians. But the same can't be said for politicians and officials. Could a situation arise in which the military seizes power in Ukraine?

Unfortunately, yes. We live in a world where anything is possible. But what you're describing would be a negative development for our country. We would like to avoid that outcome.

That's why we are doing everything we can to prevent Ukraine from reaching a crisis point where the military might even begin to consider such a scenario.

Let's move on to the situation at the front. How would you assess the situation around Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad in Donbas? Should Ukraine continue fighting for those areas or should it withdraw its forces, which are already nearly encircled?

Ukraine didn't withdraw its forces from there — Ukraine was pushed out.

How did that happen? Well, unfortunately, you can't always win in war; sometimes, you have to take losses. Ukraine has been fighting the largest war in Europe since the end of World War II for several years now. It's a war against an enemy with numerical, economic and military superiority.

It's clear that under these conditions — especially with chaotic and inconsistent support from our partners, particularly the major powers — this is what happens: we retreat.

You asked about Pokrovsk. Yes, everyone is watching what's happening there. But the most serious problems right now are in Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. And no one is talking about them, or if they are, it's very little.

At the same time, there are about seven situations along the front similar to what we're seeing in Pokrovsk. That means there are at least seven sectors where we are losing territory and can't stop it.

So there are currently seven "Pokrovsks," but the rest of the front line is stable?

There are primary directions of attack, which is why the enemy concentrates its forces and resources in those areas. To concentrate them, they must either be gathered from reserves, which means having reserves to begin with, or pulled from other sectors of the front.

So, there are parts of the front where Russian forces are actively advancing and Ukraine's armed forces are actively defending. And there are parts where the front line isn't shifting much.

That doesn't mean there aren't FPV drones and other unmanned aerial vehicles flying overhead or that artillery isn't firing or that remote mining isn't taking place or that people aren't being killed every day. But at this stage of the war, those sectors are not the main axes of combat.

For example, a few years ago the Kherson direction was one of the most active. Ukraine was trying to cross the Dnipro and establish a foothold in Krynky. At one point, the most intense fighting on the entire front was happening there. Now, the situation in that area has calmed considerably in terms of active combat.

Still, civilians are being killed in Kherson every day and the military continues to repel Russian attempts to break through our positions.

You mentioned the attempt to cross the Dnipro River near Krynky. Last year, we saw a Ukrainian Armed Forces operation in Kursk Oblast. At the time, one of its stated goals was to force the Russians to divert troops from other parts of the front to Kursk. But soldiers I spoke to in the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia directions during the Kursk operation said that the Russians didn't reduce their activity there, despite the supposed need to send reinforcements to Kursk. So why was the Kursk operation necessary at all?

I wouldn't evaluate that operation in the context of this war as either positive or negative. But you'll never win a war by sitting in defensive positions. Defense alone only leads to losses.

The strategic initiative now belongs to the enemy and as long as they hold it, they will eventually find a weak spot in your defenses, break through, the front will collapse and so on. Passive defense does not lead to victory — it leads to defeat.

That's why, from time to time, it's necessary to try to seize the strategic initiative.

The Kursk Oblast operation was just such an attempt. We succeeded in redirecting international attention, including media coverage, as well as the Russians' own attention for six months to what was happening directly on their territory.

Did we succeed in pulling Russian forces away from other areas? Yes, we did. Was it a priority for us in terms of equipment and manpower? Yes.

Should we perhaps have withdrawn from there earlier? Maybe. But while our troops were on Russian territory, it forced the Russians to concentrate significant resources there, which prevented them from breaking through more deeply in other places than they managed at the time.

Of course, the Kursk operation had both positives and negatives, but the world isn't black and white. What matters is that sitting passively in a defensive position achieves nothing. Defense can be a phase for regrouping ahead of an offensive, but it cannot be a long-term war strategy.

Ukraine has been on the defensive for a long time now. But instead of building up reserves for an offensive, new troops are being rushed to the front lines because there just aren't enough men.

Maybe the issue isn't the number of men, but rather how they're distributed and used. There's a hypothesis that Ukraine — currently mobilizing about 30,000 men a month, at least according to media reports — should actually be mobilizing far fewer, around 15,000. Because quantity doesn't equal quality.

The goal of mobilization is to replenish the units already on the battlefield. And of the 30,000 we're mobilizing, a significant number never reach the front due to health or other reasons. Others leave their units within weeks or months without permission, desert or are legally discharged.

At the same time, the state is spending enormous resources to find these people, process them through the mobilization system, send them to training centers, pay them, clothe them, house them in military units and so on.

So the issue isn't the quantity of mobilized personnel — it's efficiency and quality.

Another major problem is how personnel are being allocated. I don't understand why we continue forming new brigades and even direct-subordinate units within the army corps currently being established. Meanwhile, every brigade commander, every operational-tactical commander says it would be better to send those people to reinforce existing units and then the front wouldn't collapse.

These kinds of decisions are illogical.

With Oleksandr Syrskyi's appointment as commander-in-chief, a practice began of dismantling brigades. This involves removing an artillery unit, an infantry battalion or a mortar company from a brigade fighting in a specific sector and transferring them to another part of the front where they operate under a different brigade's command. Why is this being done and more importantly, how effective is this practice?

Unfortunately, the war is still being fought with pieced-together units. Starting almost back in 2022, we began pulling companies, batteries and battalions out of one brigade and transferring them elsewhere to plug gaps.

Is this a good thing? Obviously not. A brigade fights much more effectively when it operates with its own units — that is, when a battalion reports to its own brigade.

This started because fires had to be put out, figuratively speaking. Initially, brigades were pulled from the reserves formed in February–March 2022. That means the whole brigade might not yet have been combat-ready, but, for example, the first and second battalions were already fully manned. So those battalions were taken and thrown straight into battle. And then the same happened with the next ones and the next...

So this actually started under the previous commander-in-chief, Valerii Zaluzhnyi? I only noticed it after Syrskyi took over.

No, it began back in March 2022 because fires had to be put out. But that was just the first stage.

The second stage started at the end of the Battle of Kyiv. That's when Territorial Defense brigades began to be used to reinforce the Ground Forces and Air Assault brigades. For example, two battalions from Lviv Oblast were taken and sent to, say, Sumy Oblast.

Was that justified? On one hand, it's irrational to keep 50,000 men with weapons and equipment in central and western Ukraine when the front is falling apart. They should be where they're needed.

On the other hand, we didn't use them as full-fledged units — we scattered them among other brigades. Sometimes, even within a single brigade, they weren't deployed to the front as a proper battalion but were split into smaller groups and distributed among the existing battalions.

And that's a bad practice.

So this practice has now trickled down from the higher command level to brigades and even smaller units?

Exactly. One battalion might get a company attached, another gets two platoons and a third gets an additional platoon.

In other words, these composite units rarely fight as full battalions. And yes, it's a terrible practice, but there's reality, the real world, and it demands solutions here and now.

Would it be possible to end this practice?

It is possible, but it would require halting the creation of new military units.

A general from the older generation — though still relatively young himself — once said something very insightful to me: "Disbanding 20 to 30 brigades right now would allow Ukraine to keep fighting for another two or three years."

Recently, news came out not just about the formation of a new unit, but of an entirely new branch of the armed forces — the Assault Guard. Why is this needed? Are they Syrskyi's personal guard to be used for putting out new fires?

Assault units essentially act as fire brigades — stopping breakthroughs at the front. And they're actually quite good at it.

The other question is how many resources they require, meaning personnel and equipment, and what their losses look like. I don't know why there's a need to create yet another branch of the armed forces. Maybe it's because every colonel wants to become a general and since there aren't that many general positions, new ones have to be created.

At the same time, we can't say the existing Air Assault Forces are ineffective because, in large part, they're the ones holding the front together.

Let's compare them, for example, to the Alpha unit of the Security Service of Ukraine, which has a few thousand fighters and because of its small size can recruit the best of the best and therefore achieve better results. The Air Assault Forces, by contrast, are a large, mass army that includes tens of thousands of soldiers.

But every air assault brigade is better than most other brigades in the armed forces. And yet, we're now trying to create another new branch of the military.

All right — so we don't need new brigades or branches of the armed forces. But why create army corps? We already had operational-strategic groupings like South, East and North. Why do we need corps now?

Because up until now, we've had a temporary, not permanent, command structure. The only permanent elements were the brigades. Brigades were grouped into tactical groups, formed temporarily from available personnel. These tactical groups were then combined into operational-tactical groups, again led by temporarily appointed commanders. And those operational-tactical groups were overseen by temporary operational-strategic groupings.

So, the goal is to move away from these ad hoc command bodies to permanent ones. That means: here is a corps, complete with troops, a corps commander, deputy commanders, sector commanders responsible for specific areas, equipped with weapons and a full structure of units or formations.

In principle, a corps could replace a tactical group or half of an operational-tactical group, depending on its size. But in reality, that didn't happen and couldn't happen because the command staff of a single corps consists of around 300 senior officers. We're in the process of forming about 20 corps and we simply don't have that many well-trained people.

And that leads to serious problems. For example, someone who was a battalion commander is promoted to deputy corps commander because there's no one else. In some cases, the commander of an entire branch of the armed forces is a major, when just recently he was a captain. A brigade commander might be a junior lieutenant. In one brigade, the current commander was a company commander just a year ago.

That kind of rapid promotion is too much even for the most brilliant people. And it's a problem.

So the problem is a shortage of officers?

Not just that. Every corps requires around ten so-called directly subordinate units, which simply don't exist. These units are currently being formed, but there's no money, no personnel, no equipment and no other resources for them. As a result, their combat readiness is minimal.

And on top of that, the corps itself doesn't fight. It doesn't operate with its own full complement of forces because we can't pause the front and reorganize everything so that each corps commands its own units.

As soon as one brigade pulls back and another replaces it, there's a breakthrough on the front. We've seen this happen dozens of times in different sectors: the moment one brigade rotates out and another takes its place, the front starts to collapse.

So on the one hand, we need to get rid of the tactical and operational-tactical groups, because they're simply ineffective. And in their place, we need to build permanent command structures.

But on the other hand, we have no real capacity to do that.

You mentioned a major who commands an entire branch of the armed forces. There's only one such major — Robert "Magyar" Brovdi, head of the Drone Forces. But why create a separate military branch for unmanned systems at all when every brigade already has drones?

The question of why the Drone Forces were created should really be directed to those who made that decision.

The idea was to establish a drone ecosystem, meaning a centralized and standardized system for drone specifications, training, procurement and use on the front lines.

I'm thinking about the fact that there are different types of drones — those used in the air, on land and at sea. And all of that has been placed under a single branch of the military?

That's how it turned out. But in general, the main responsibility of the Drone Forces is long-range strikes, meaning deep strikes into Russian rear areas.

But they're not the only ones involved. The Defense Intelligence Directorate, the Security Service of Ukraine, the Border Guard and the Special Operations Forces Command are also engaged in deep-strike operations. So basically, everyone's involved in deep strikes. (laughs)

We have separate battalions, regiments and even brigades operating at the tactical level using, for example, FPV drones and drone bombers. Within the Drone Forces, there are also units operating over shorter ranges — up to about 150 to 300 kilometers.

Is the Drone Line working? (The Drone Line is a project initiated by the Ukrainian president, composed exclusively of drone warfare units. Its goal is to create a 10–15 kilometer-deep kill zone where the enemy cannot move without taking losses. It operates within the Drone Forces. – A.A.)

I don't think so.

Even though the numbers and presentations are very impressive, in reality we've pulled many good teams and skilled pilots out of frontline brigades and reassigned them to second-echelon units, specifically into Drone Line formations. And yes, they're showing good results there.

But responsibility for holding the line lies with the brigade at the front. And if that brigade fails, the front collapses.

And why did that particular brigade fail? Because, for example, it doesn't receive billions of hryvnias in direct state purchases and it doesn't have unlimited authority to pull fighters from other brigades into its ranks. It doesn't have the same rights as elite brigades.

And we're seeing the results of that both on the map and on the battlefield. We're not advancing. For some reason, we're retreating. That means we're doing something wrong.

Even if the numbers in the presentations look very nice.

One more question about deep strikes. Can Ukraine carry out attacks deep in enemy territory independently, without the help of Western partners?

Ukraine can strike and does strike. But with help from our partners, it would definitely be more effective.

We can open Google Maps and see where an oil refinery is located, but we don't know the current position of the air defense systems protecting that refinery. Thanks to intelligence from our partners, we do know where those systems are and we can plan our flight paths accordingly to avoid areas where Russian air defenses are active.

It's also important to remember that our primary weapons rely on components made by American and European manufacturers. We're not talking about China, because that's an open market for everyone. But we can't purchase these components from U.S. or European companies without their governments' approval.

Without those components, our strikes would still continue and might even be cheaper, but the quality would drop significantly.

How effective are Ukraine's strikes on Russian infrastructure, particularly oil refineries? According to economists, Russia's refining capacity has only dropped by 3 percent in recent months.

This is one of the few strategic areas where Ukraine can strike back at the Russians. And we can do it with our partners, but also without them.

This is how we bring the war onto Russian territory. Yes, 3 percent may sound like a small number, but 3 percent can turn into 6, 9 or even 20 percent. At some point, it could trigger a collapse.

But to get from 3 to 6 percent, you have to keep at it. You have to refine your tools and tactics, gain experience and keep going. Because if you stop at 3 percent, 6 percent just won't happen.

Many ordinary people often say that instead of conducting deep strikes on Russian territory, Ukraine's military and civilian leadership should focus on strengthening air defenses. Is it possible to build an air defense system that Shahed drones can't penetrate?

Defensive systems are always harder to develop than offensive ones.

Today, building an attack drone is relatively fast, cheap and simple. But creating a system capable of neutralizing that drone is much more complex and costly. That's why, in many cases, it makes more sense for us to invest in offensive capabilities rather than defensive ones.

Ukraine is an enormous country, with many cities and critical facilities that need to be defended. It would be easier to reach parity with Russia in this area and then, for example, agree that such weapons won't be used against each other.

Right now, Ukraine already relies heavily on Western partners for air defense. But even then, no country can fully withstand the sheer volume of offensive weapons Russia is deploying. Just look at how many KABs (guided bombs – A.A.) and Shahed drones they launch every month.

How can glide bombs (KABs) be intercepted?

We have to shoot down their carriers. (KABs are launched from military aircraft – ed.)

And why isn't that happening? Ukraine has F-16 fighter jets now, doesn't it?

We're not shooting them down because we can't. Our aircraft are from the 1980s, while Russia's are built in 2025. That's why we can't take them down.

To do that, Ukraine should have been given long-range weapons back in 2022, when we first asked for them — like ATACMS missiles, which could've been used to destroy aircraft and helicopters right on the airfields within our reach.

As soon as we did get them, we destroyed a couple dozen Russian helicopters in Melitopol and Luhansk — literally in just a few strikes, overnight.

But all of that came too late. Everything we receive from our partners arrives not when it's needed, but with a delay. We're still receiving tanks, Patriot systems, artillery, cruise missiles — you name it — but only a year or two after the fact.

If we had gotten all of it on time, this war might already be over.

How critical is the current situation with mobilization and how can this problem be solved?

First, we need to understand what exactly is going wrong with mobilization. We need to conduct a proper study analyzing the process step by step.

Next, we have to identify what can be fixed in the short term, what can be improved in the medium term and what is completely unfixable and accept that reality.

We need to know where our breaking point is — that is, how much longer we can continue fighting at this pace. And we must do everything we can to push that point further into the future, so the enemy reaches theirs before we reach ours.

Those are very good questions. Do you have the answers?

That requires research.

Can you do that research? Has anyone asked you to?

Yes, the Ministry of Defense. Many people in positions of power understand how critical the situation is and are doing everything they can — sometimes even the impossible — to change it. Unfortunately, that doesn't apply to everyone in power. And it's not about specific individuals — the scale of the problems is simply too vast for a few people to fix alone. So, all we can do is keep bailing water from a sinking ship, even if it's sinking slowly.

But is it possible to save the ship?

It absolutely is. Because we're here and we're working on it every day. This ship can not only be saved, but also raised and steered back on course. We haven't yet passed the point of no return.

What do you think of the current defense minister, former Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal?

It's a very strong appointment. It gives us a chance to hold out a little longer.

So he's better than his predecessors?

That's obvious. He was a prime minister — he knows how the government apparatus works, how budgets are made. He's a public servant in the best sense of the word. He's someone who can turn the Defense Ministry into an actual institution, which is exactly what we needed.

And what was the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense doing before Mr. Shmyhal's appointment?

Foreign relations, judging by Mr. Umerov's travel schedule. (Rustem Umerov served as Ukraine's defense minister from 2023 to 2025 – ed.)

All right, so Shmyhal is a better defense minister than Umerov. But who do you think is the better commander-in-chief — Zaluzhnyi or Syrskyi?

You can't compare them like that. They are different people, in different circumstances, during different phases of the war. They have different powers, different capabilities and different leadership styles. Both of them have many strengths but also weaknesses.

What are Syrskyi's strengths?

He's one of the most brilliant Ukrainian generals — and that's a fact.

Then why is Ukraine losing?

But we haven't lost. We could have. We don't know what would have happened if he hadn't been there. Maybe we would have lost already.

And what would a Ukrainian victory look like as of fall 2025? What exactly should we be wishing for when we say we wish Ukraine victory?

The disappearance of Russia as a threat to Europe. That could mean the country breaks apart into several smaller entities or it becomes so consumed by internal problems that, for decades, it forgets about trying to destabilize Ukraine, its neighbors or the rest of the world. Just like the Soviet Union vanished.

But right now it's the opposite. Russia may not be thriving, but it's managing, it's fighting, its troops are advancing and Putin is pleased.

Then we should be preparing for a major war in Europe.

Can that be prevented?

Yes, if we prepare for it and allow Ukraine to win its war. Because a combined Ukraine-Russia war machine will eventually reach the English Channel.

And what should we in the Baltic states be preparing for?

You have your own context and your own territory. Unfortunately, it's not as large as Ukraine's, so there's no room to fall back. It's clear that a small country cannot stand up to Russia alone.

But you can raise the cost of invasion so high that it becomes unacceptable for the aggressor. That's the basic rule of survival: don't be the easiest target — make sure someone else is easier than you.

The second point is to hold out as long as possible, hoping that NATO will intervene. So do everything you can to avoid war. Help Ukraine. As long as Ukraine is at war, other countries are not. We are holding Russia back, preventing it from pushing farther.

The Russian army is now stronger than any European army. Their battlefield experience outweighs even the most advanced weaponry in any single country.

So is NATO a paper tiger?

Right now — yes. You'd be very surprised to see what would happen if any currently active Russian battalion went up against a NATO brigade. (A brigade has five to ten times more personnel than a battalion – ed.)

That doesn't sound very optimistic to put it mildly...

It's absolutely critical to recognize and admit to ourselves that the world may not always be the way it is today. Before the full-scale invasion, Ukraine refused to believe such a thing could happen. I spoke with all kinds of people — ministers, deputy ministers, members of parliament — and none of them truly believed a major war was possible.

Not because the president said so or anyone else, but simply because they couldn't imagine it. If you haven't experienced it, it feels impossible because it's so terrifying that you don't want to think about it.

And that's exactly what led to this war. And now, Ukraine doesn't want to think about the possibility of losing because that's just as terrifying.

After all these years of holding out, after preserving so much territory, losing so many people and killing so many enemies, after achieving so much the idea of losing it all is unbearable.

And we don't want to believe it could happen.

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