On Thursday, you presented the national defense report or rather its draft to members of the National Defense Committee. The draft had already leaked to the media earlier in the week and sparked controversy due to its criticisms of former defense forces commanders Riho Terras and Martin Herem. Both Herem and Terras quickly moved to refute the critical claims made in the draft. It also seems that the media sided with Terras and Herem, turning their criticism toward the report's authors. How did it happen that a leaked preliminary version began circulating before the report had even been approved by the committee?

Well, much of what happened has already been described. It's true, we didn't get the chance to present our message. And as for how it leaked — it's quite simple. The chairman of the National Defense Committee [Kalev Stoicescu] requested a few weeks in advance to review the draft. So the draft was sent to the committee members. It was never intended for the general public.

And indeed, we didn't manage to present it [on Thursday] as planned. We were only able to briefly touch on the methodology because there was so little time. But I want to offer some reassurance: yes, a few names were mentioned, but the team behind the report was much broader. Experts from various fields were involved — economists, social scientists, as well as senior and high-ranking officers with whom we consulted. So the team behind the report was actually much larger — more than 20 people in total.

But what's your impression, do you think someone may have deliberately leaked the draft in order to shape the narrative, so to speak?

Absolutely. In fact, we actually anticipated that because we've seen it happen before — any time there's even the slightest bit of criticism or a more critical tone toward the work of the committee, those documents tend to get out immediately.

But on the other hand, I didn't really have any other option — the committee chair asked to review the draft and that's a completely legitimate request.

The report is quite extensive for the average reader and requires time to properly review. Of course, we didn't need to present it to half the committee, as they were deeply involved in drafting it. Just as a side note, we worked extremely hard on this throughout the summer. And during that time, any committee member who was interested could've simply picked up the phone and asked — we would've gladly given them an update on our progress, what the main focus areas were and so on. But no such interest was shown.

How would you summarize, based on the report, the main shortcomings and key problems in Estonia's national defense?

Our conclusions don't differ all that much from those of the National Audit Office. We also found systemic issues. The most concerning thing for me is that when you ask for the protocols or analyses behind fundamental changes that have been implemented in the defense sector, the National Audit Office said they weren't given access to them. We managed to go a bit further — we realized those documents don't actually exist. There are no in-depth analyses. There are discussions, decision-making meetings, protocols, but even those were relatively difficult to obtain.

Another issue — even the Ministry of Defense permanent secretary, when she took office, pointed out that internal oversight is lacking. In reality, we've been missing proper oversight for years. And now, as we're about to direct substantial resources into national defense, we need that oversight function. Parliamentary oversight is one form of oversight and, unfortunately, it hasn't been exercised up to this point.

And why hasn't our investigative press been asking: why isn't the Riigikogu fulfilling the responsibilities assigned to it by the Constitution and by the Riigikogu Rules of Procedure and Internal Rules Act? We've started to carry out the task we've been given. It's as simple as that.

The shorter, 11-page summary of the report presents a very serious assessment. I'll quote: "In the working group's view, the Estonian state as a whole is not sufficiently prepared for a potential war." Could you explain the reasoning behind that assessment?

That's quite simple. The assessment stems from the fact that we are preparing for crises and war using peacetime methods. We don't truly grasp what a crisis or war entails. We haven't experienced those kinds of crises ourselves — there's no direct experience to draw from.

But what we've seen in Ukraine provides a very clear insight. Throughout the report's drafting process, the working group constantly referred to both Russia's military doctrine and developments in Ukraine. And in some ways, the situation we're in today is one where people still say: "Let's not talk about these things." I'd remind everyone that on February 22, 2022, President Zelenskyy told the Ukrainian people that there would be no war.

People need to be spoken to honestly and directly. That's why the language of this report is honest and straightforward. Speaking frankly gives us the opportunity to address these issues just as frankly.

Also note that if the working group's recommendations are implemented, much of this can be restored very quickly. What we need is to feel and know that the country is being led. We need to strengthen the prime minister's role in times of crisis and war so that they lead decisively, not just chair meetings. This is about decision-making and the speed of decisions.

We also need local governments and society at large to be involved. We cannot place the responsibility of strategic tasks on subordinate structures. We can't expect the Rescue Board to manage a nationwide crisis. These are our conclusions: fix the structures, grant the necessary authority and make sure that at the political level, we have decision-makers with the necessary competence.

Your report offers an in-depth analysis and strong criticism of how we've ended up in the current situation. Let me quote a few lines from it: "The concept of 'affordable national defense,' implemented by the Ministry of Defense, is one of the greatest strategic mistakes of the post-independence period. Coherence has been lost between the actual threat, the nature of war and needs and our defense capabilities. Neither the annexation of Crimea nor the war in Donbas altered the so-called affordable national defense concept." Those are excerpts from the report. But who exactly made the decision to implement this so-called affordable defense concept? And who decided to continue with it even after the annexation of Crimea?

Decisions like these were made at the government level and we are not criticizing individuals, we are criticizing the decision itself. But of course, behind every decision are the decision-makers. In fact, the report does mention which ministers were responsible at the time — their names are included as well.

I looked at the leaked version, which as you've said is incomplete, but it still contains criticism of decisions made by former Commander of the Defense Forces, Gen. Riho Terras. Is that fair? For example, the report doesn't mention Prime Ministers like Andrus Ansip or Taavi Rõivas, nor does it name Jürgen Ligi. Why does the burden of blame in this report appear to fall on former defense leaders rather than the politicians who ultimately decide whether funding and decisions go forward?

No, we're not blaming the commander of the Defense Forces. What we've pointed out is that they went along with the decisions. When I was commander of the Defense League, I faced immense pressure to also consolidate. But within the limits of the Defense League's authority and mandate, that consolidation didn't happen. My successor, Riho Ühtegi, also stood firm in maintaining the core functions.

Riho Terras wasn't happy with the decision either and he put that on the record in a protocol. So he has acknowledged that it was a mistake, but it was a political decision. What we criticized was simply the fact that they accepted it.

And yes, these were political decisions. The final version of the report includes a list of defense ministers who were, in fact, responsible for carrying out the concept of affordable national defense. (The report names Mart Laar, Sven Mikser, Hannes Hanso, Margus Tsahkna, Jüri Luik, Kalle Laanet and Hanno Pevkur – ed.)

But as you've noticed, the general summary doesn't mention any names at all.

On Thursday, you presented what could be called the final version of the report to the committee. Is it significantly different from the version that was leaked to the media, where there was a strong emphasis on personal accountability and finger-pointing at Terras and Herem?

No, the report doesn't point fingers at Terras or Herem. What it points to, or rather what we've emphasized, are the decisions themselves. There are no personal accusations, only an examination of the decisions that were made. But of course, behind every decision are decision-makers. And that's exactly how it's presented in the final version.

Twenty, fifteen, even ten years ago, there wasn't much public support for increasing defense spending to a level that would ensure real defensive capability. Now that you're a politician, how should voters be mobilized or informed so that there's a mandate for a sharp increase in defense funding? We saw that even the current 5 percent level only came about when the situation in Ukraine deteriorated badly and there was reportedly significant pressure from the United States as well.

This is exactly where I see that people don't really understand what "affordable national defense" actually means — or the damage it has done. We shifted to a resource-based model. Let me give an example: Finland hasn't had particularly high defense spending, but they've methodically worked through all their defense concepts. They've carefully mapped out long-term capability development. We haven't done that.

This so-called affordable defense became entirely resource-driven — resources dictated priorities, not actual needs.

Now imagine this: in peacetime, you have one set of resources. In wartime — just look at how much Ukraine's defense forces had in peacetime and how much they have now. We need to anticipate that kind of shift.

We say our system is reserve-based. That means when the reserves are called up, the structures must already be in place and those structures require significantly more equipment, supplies and funding. The entire state must be recalibrated — its resources reassessed and realigned. And so on and so forth.

This report isn't narrowly focused on national defense — it also addresses energy security. It includes criticism of the government's past energy policy decisions and there's criticism directed at solar and wind energy, particularly for their negative impact on defense capabilities, such as interfering with signal intelligence and early warning systems. Why did you include this area in the report and what is your recommendation to the government in this context?

That's very simple. You say "national defense," but the report's title makes it clear — we're dealing with security more broadly. We were tasked with providing input for the fundamentals of national security policy. And in that framework, military defense is just a small part. The security policy foundations also cover all other critical sectors.

In fact, this scope should be much broader. Other parliamentary committees should also be reviewing their respective fields to ensure that the entire spectrum of national security policy is addressed.

Why did we include these topics specifically? For a very simple reason. When Russia attacked Ukraine, their first goal was to destroy the Ukrainian military. That didn't work. So they shifted strategies — they targeted the country's infrastructure, primarily its energy infrastructure.

We're also pointing this out. And our former colleagues from the intelligence community are saying the same: there is a problem here. It is a concern — very much so.

And again, if we fall back on the rhetorical argument that "Estonia is small," then we must remember: there are two things we absolutely cannot trade — time and space. So when we say, "We don't need early warning," we're making a critical mistake. Early warning is vital for our survival. It is the single most important element that allows us to analyze, prepare and understand what our adversary is doing and what might be coming.

And briefly — how exactly do solar and wind farms interfere with early warning systems?

They disrupt signal intelligence. My background is in electrical engineering, but to fully understand the scope of the issue, we brought in subject-matter experts — radio engineers — to explain it. And essentially, the level of electromagnetic noise they generate is so high that it interferes with signal intelligence capabilities.

The experts told us that, under current conditions, the only effective compensation mechanism would be asking the Russians to increase their transmission power — obviously not a viable option. And that's just the situation today. If we keep expanding these installations, the interference will only grow.

Now, there are places in Estonia where solar and wind farms can be built. But when we looked at the long-term energy strategy, we saw that it only works if you set clear priorities. And right now, it's a choice between national security and climate neutrality goals.

And what is your recommendation to the government?

Security needs to be the priority right now. We can move forward once effective compensation mechanisms are in place. Energy security is fundamental — if there's electricity, society functions; if there's no electricity, society doesn't function.

Your report has also been criticized for including everything that came to mind, lacking focus. Some have said it undermines the report's credibility when it includes arguments like "this was not pleasing in the eyes of God." That kind of language has made the report an easy target and allowed people to overlook the very real issues it does raise.

Yes, that's true. There's always someone who latches onto a foolish phrase like that. That's exactly why I asked four people to serve as control readers for the report. They reviewed it and gave feedback and that particular phrase was flagged right away — it was clearly not something that should have been in there. And of course, it's not. That line does not appear in the final version.

That's the risk with drafts — they're just that: drafts. And if someone chooses to deliberately leak one, I can't say what their motive was — whether it was to slow down the process, to make themselves seem in-the-know or something else entirely. But those kinds of phrases are no longer in the report.

I can even tell you who my control readers were: former Minister of Regional Affairs Vallo Reimaa, former State Secretary and now well-known economic expert Raivo Vare (who was minister of state in the transitional government from 1990–1992), former Air Force Commander Vello Loemaa and later on Peeter Espak also contributed subject-matter guidance.

Yesterday on Vikerraadio, President Alar Karis was asked to comment on the report. He said: "There's more focus on looking backward, trying to assign blame, instead of looking to the future. And now there's a bit of mudslinging already, even though the report isn't officially adopted yet. That said, of course, every member of the Riigikogu and the Riigikogu as a whole has the right to produce whatever reports they choose. But every politician should also consider what impact a given document might have. How much good will it do and how much harm? So let's see where this report goes. But what we're already seeing is the emergence of yet another conflict in society — something we certainly do not want." That's what the president said. How do you respond to his criticism?

In some ways, the president is right. I listened to his interview in full... And what you'll notice is that nearly everyone commenting on this report starts by saying: "Well, I haven't actually read the report." Some have skimmed it, others glanced through it diagonally — what that tells you is that people haven't actually read it.

But to move forward, we first need to understand where the strategic missteps have been and that's exactly what we've outlined.

And if you look at our recommendations for the way forward, they cover about 15 pages.

Another point: it's not just that members of the Riigikogu have the right to do this — if you look at the mandate we've been given, we have an obligation to do this work. In fact, we've been failing to fulfill that obligation for quite some time.

If the report is approved next week after further discussion, what should happen next?

If you look at what's expected of the report, then the next step has to be discussion. It should serve as a foundation for setting future directions. Granted, the discussion has already started, though not in the most constructive form. But still, debates need to follow. We'll present the report to the full Riigikogu. It's a political document in the sense that it isn't binding on anyone, but we hope that people will find the core message in it.

I'm asking listeners today whether the criticism of past defense leadership decisions is justified. How would you answer — yes or no?

Well, who in Estonia could truly be above criticism? I'm being criticized today and I accept that. Is there some clause written into the role of the commander of the Defense Forces that says they must not be criticized?

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