Former German Chancellor Angela Merkel claimed in a recent interview with the Hungarian outlet Partizan that the Baltic states and Poland prevented the European Union from holding direct talks with Russia — discussions which, in her view, could have averted the full-scale war in Ukraine in 2021.

In response, I would offer a few counterarguments. First, this claim ignores the historical pattern of Russia's behavior. Second, Merkel's own political legacy — and the choices made by her party — are at stake, both of which have been severely tested by Europe's ongoing security crisis.

When Russia occupied Crimea in 2014, Germany and France sought to broker a ceasefire between Ukraine and Russia through the so-called Normandy Format. This effort produced two agreements known as the Minsk accords.

The first of these, signed in September 2014, was meant to halt fighting in Donbas. Yet the illusion of peace proved to be nothing more than propaganda. Russian forces and their separatist proxies continued their assaults, culminating in the Battle of Debaltseve in early 2015.

This led Merkel and French President François Hollande to push for a new peace plan — the second Minsk agreement — which effectively froze the conflict. As is well known, that too failed to change Russia's imperial ambition: to subjugate Ukraine within its ideological sphere and block its integration with the West. Merkel herself later admitted that the Minsk accords were never a step toward lasting peace but rather a means to "buy time."

Stepping aside

Russia used the Minsk accords deliberately as a tactical tool — a way to strengthen its military position and prepare for the next phase of aggression. They fit into a broader pattern that has defined Vladimir Putin's foreign policy strategy for decades.

In 2002, the NATO–Russia Council was established to foster dialogue on an equal footing and build trust between the West and Moscow. In reality, the framework became a tool for Russia to test and undermine Western unity.

At the 2007 Munich Security Conference, Vladimir Putin delivered a speech that shattered the illusion of a strategic partnership. His message was clear: Russia did not see the West as an ally, but as an ideological adversary. A year later, Russian tanks rolling into Georgia confirmed that those words were not mere rhetoric, but part of a deliberate policy of power projection. At that time, diplomatic contacts between Russia and the West were closer than ever.

The same spirit of European concession appeared again at NATO's 2008 Bucharest Summit, where, under Russian pressure, Ukraine and Georgia were denied a clear membership perspective.

That was the moment when the West made its move — by stepping out of the aggressor's way and leaving Ukraine and Georgia as pawns on the chessboard. The consequences soon followed: Russian forces marched into Tbilisi and the same scenario played out in Donbas just a few years later.

Here lies the first contradiction in Merkel's claim: if Russia failed to honor agreements even during periods of active engagement with Europe's major powers, it is hard to believe that in 2021 — when Putin had long stopped making promises to the West — any new diplomatic framework could have prevented what followed.

Right-wing populists come out on top

Under pressure from critics — especially in the context of the war in Ukraine — Merkel has clearly been on the defensive in recent years. This is evident in her newly published memoir "Freedom: Memoirs 1954–2021" in which she reflects on the reasoning behind her political decisions.

Her greatest Achilles' heel has been the Nord Stream 2 project — a decision she has consistently defended as a pragmatic choice made in light of the political and social climate at the time, with the stated goal of ensuring stability rather than dependence. In reality, it tied Germany's economy more deeply to Russian energy and, above all, undermined Europe's credibility in the eyes of its international partners.

Merkel continues to wield considerable influence as an opinion leader in Germany and remains a respected voice in the media, particularly on foreign policy matters. Her former party, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), however, has lost much of its once-solid popularity among an increasingly polarized electorate.

Meanwhile, the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) has evolved from a Eurosceptic protest movement into a radical nationalist-populist force, with especially strong support in eastern Germany. In the 2025 elections, the AfD won more than 21 percent of the vote, becoming the country's second-largest party, while the CDU and its Bavarian sister party, the CSU, fell to around 29 percent — far below the 40 percent mark the conservatives regularly achieved during Merkel's era.

There are, therefore, many reasons why Merkel has sought to reinterpret her legacy. Her recent remarks — including her criticism of the Baltic states and Poland — reflect a desire to remain relevant on the political stage and to withstand strong domestic criticism over Europe's security policy.

Russia has never been a partner with whom dialogue leads to peace. History has shown time and again that negotiations serve the Kremlin only as a means to regain leverage; agreements are accepted under pressure and, strategically, serve only to buy time. Ukraine, together with Europe, did not end up in war because some countries refused to talk to Putin — but because too many still believed that Russia was worth talking to.

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