Peeter Kaasik: The Forest Brothers during the German occupation

On Resistance Fighting Day, attention usually turns to the Forest Brothers. Less noticed is that during World War II, Estonia's statehood was attacked by two criminal regimes — those of Stalin and Hitler — both of which forced people into the forests to escape persecution, writes Peeter Kaasik.
In 1941, a number of residents from the villages of Vaguja, Araste and Kurevere had gone into hiding among so-called "forest brother" bands, which at the time consisted of up to 30 men. When the Germans announced a mobilization in 1943, many of these "forest brothers" went underground once again, unwilling to serve in the German army. After the arrival of the Red Army, they continued to hide, not wanting to serve in the Soviet military either. (Aleksander Resev)
Today, Forest Brothers are generally defined as men and women who hid from Soviet rule for political reasons, many of whom took up arms in the fight for Estonia's freedom. Forest brotherhood — albeit under different names — is a tradition that stretches back centuries, involving those who sought refuge from foreign occupiers and/or plundering armies in forests, marsh islands, bogs and other uninhabited places.
Although Estonia remained largely untouched by major European wars for a couple of centuries following the Great Northern War in the early 18th century, the tradition of going into hiding never disappeared. Even in times of relative peace, many still chose to disappear: runaway serfs, people in conflict with authorities (or landlords) and, most commonly, those seeking to avoid military conscription.
This latter tradition remained strong even into the mid-20th century, as noted in the introductory quote from a January 1945 report by Aleksander Resev, people's commissar for internal affairs of the Estonian SSR. The report also confirms that many chose to hide during both the Soviet and German occupations. These individuals have left little mark in historical literature. On this Resistance Fighting Day, it is worth remembering that forest brother activity during the German occupation is also part of Estonia's resistance to foreign rule.
Mobilization into the Wehrmacht main driver of forest brotherhood
Mass hiding in Estonia began during the June 1941 Soviet deportations. When war broke out between the Soviet Union and Germany, the ranks of those going into hiding grew to include men avoiding mobilization into the Red Army, as well as general wartime refugees.
Hiding did not cease after the front line moved away and active combat ended. Among the new fugitives were individuals who had collaborated with Soviet authorities during 1940–1941 but had, for various reasons, remained in Estonia. Lacking public support, they did not last long; over the following months, the police and local defense units captured most of them.
No active communist resistance movement took shape in Estonia and the partisan-diversionary units sent from behind Soviet lines failed to breathe life into any real partisan activity. There were isolated communists who managed to stay in hiding for extended periods — some were never caught — but such cases were the exception. This group is not considered part of the Forest Brother Movement or the national resistance.
Forest Brotherhood as a distinct phenomenon during the German occupation began to take shape in 1943. While other factors played a role, the vast majority of new Forest Brothers were men evading German mobilizations and other forms of forced conscription, such as mandatory labor service or, later, service in the local defense forces.
Open mobilization began in Estonia in November 1943, when men born in 1925 were called up, followed by a similar order in December for those born in 1924. But this was not the first mobilization. A covert mobilization had already begun in the spring of 1943 under the guise of labor service in Germany. Men were given a "choice": either "volunteer" for the Estonian SS Legion or be assigned some other role in the war industry or military auxiliary services.
A general mobilization was announced at the end of January 1944 for birth cohorts from 1904 to 1923. With the addition of those granted deferrals, as well as the mobilization of the 1926 cohort during the summer of 1944 and the conscription of the 1927 cohort into the air force and navy auxiliary services, around 50,000 men were mobilized in total. In addition, as of early 1944, local defense service was made mandatory for all adult men up to the age of 60, replacing the previous upper limit of 45 set in the fall of 1943.
Naturally, many had no desire to shed blood for Hitler, no matter how these actions — illegal under international law — were dressed up in nationalist rhetoric. Even the covert mobilization and labor conscription of 1943 triggered a wave of mass escapes to Finland, but many men also chose to go into hiding within Estonia itself.
The ranks of Forest Brothers and fugitives continued to grow with later mobilizations, as well as with deserters from Estonian units within the German army. In total, the number of men who evaded German military or labor service for a shorter or longer time likely reached into the tens of thousands.
Attitude toward forest bothers during German occupation
The term "Forest Brother" entered common usage under the influence of wartime propaganda institutions, more or less in parallel with the emergence of the Forest Brother Movement during the German occupation. Before World War II, the term had largely negative connotations.
During the war summer of 1941, the term "Forest Brother" was occasionally used as a synonym for "resistance fighter," but it wasn't in widespread use. The term "partisan" was more common. However, in the eyes of the German occupation authorities, "partisan" had a negative connotation, being associated with communist fighters on the opposing side. In fact, there was an effort to avoid even the term "partisan," preferring to use the word "bandit" instead. While the term "partisan" didn't disappear entirely from written texts referring to anti-Soviet fighters, "forest brother" gradually replaced it.
As part of directed propaganda, the meaning of "Forest Brother" also expanded. Initially, it referred only to active resistance fighters, but by 1942 at the latest, it had come to include those who had simply gone into hiding from Soviet authorities during the war summer of 1941.
Naturally, in everyday speech, the general term "Forest Brother" began to be used for those hiding from German authorities as well. This caused frustration among propagandists. For instance, on August 5, 1943, the newspaper Eesti Sõna published a public education article titled "Forest Brotherhood," which tried to add some topical nuances and explain to readers why it was inappropriate to use that term for those evading German conscription — grouping them together with the heroes of the Summer War.
The mindset of the time is aptly summed up in a memoir by Haljend Vasser, a Forest Brother during the German era, who recalled his father's advice to avoid German mobilization: "Son, don't stick your nose into politics — when two great powers are fighting, stay out of it."
When it came to the recruitment efforts of 1941–1943, the general sentiment was that small nations should stay out of conflicts between empires and that they would never be too late in joining such wars — better not to join at all. Public attitudes toward the Forest Brothers, if not outright positive, were at least neutral and understanding.
It's impossible to determine with certainty what motivated individual people to go into hiding. Presumably, many responded to appeals from the national resistance movement — or more accurately, from passive opposition.
Nationalists based their position on the right to self-determination for nations, as declared in the Atlantic Charter, and viewed both criminal regimes — the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany — as enemies. Throughout 1943, the core message of the nationalist movement's appeals was to boycott recruitment into the German army.
To draw a parallel, in Lithuania general mobilization was considered unfeasible due to widespread public resistance. At the beginning of 1944, when the Red Army reached the Lithuanian border, the Lithuanian national resistance movement finally expressed a willingness to support mobilization in some form. Looking at initial mobilization plans, it can be assumed that the Germans also expected that if mobilization in Estonia didn't outright fail, there would at least be widespread evasion.
A turning point came with a radio interview featuring Jüri Uluots. Uluots, formally prime minister acting as president and one of the few senior politicians to escape Soviet repression, had until then kept a low profile and avoided public association with German authorities. The interview aired on February 7, 1944 and was later published in the major newspapers, reaching the majority of the Estonian population.
This was Uluots' first public political statement during the German occupation, and in it he called for support of the mobilization. This didn't signal a full change in course, but rather hinted that in a situation where the Red Army had already re-entered Estonia, Estonians should support the real power on the ground — not an illusory one. The priority was to repel the Bolsheviks and a compromise with the Germans regarding the continuity of the Republic of Estonia could be reached later.
The underground nationalist opposition quickly adjusted its position, and in the spring of 1944, the newly formed National Committee of the Republic of Estonia adopted Uluots' views as its own. His radio address clearly contributed to the success of the general mobilization, which drew nearly 40,000 men — many more than had been expected. But this doesn't mean there were no evaders. Many men also deserted from their units later on.
Among the general public, these Forest Brothers were not openly labeled as traitors (or bandits), but attitudes toward them were negative or hesitant — and this perception has tended to persist. For example, in the manifesto "Ideological Foundations of Forest Brotherhood," written by forest brothers during the renewed Soviet occupation in 1947–1949, those who had evaded mobilization were treated with understanding — but also used as an example of resistance lacking ideology or direction and therefore destined to achieve nothing.
The essence of the situation was summed up quite well by legendary forest brother Alfred Käärmann:
"...if they were caught, they spent a few weeks in jail before being sent to a unit. The German authorities didn't punish them harshly, because under international law, conscription couldn't be imposed in an occupied country. Estonian police and local defense men didn't bother with Forest Brothers who were simply trying to save their own skin. After all, they were local boys and posed no threat. Some of them were armed, but they didn't commit robberies — they had no need. They got food, shelter and liquor from their homes and farms, where they sometimes even worked. Besides, the German occupation authorities didn't impose any penalties on the families or helpers of Forest Brothers."
Käärmann may oversimplify the situation somewhat, but broadly speaking, that's how it was. At least the 1944 general mobilization was considered a success, and in the interest of domestic peace and to avoid the radicalization of Forest Brothers, there were no major repressions or widespread harassment of their supporters or family members. From the German authorities' perspective, those in hiding were an inconvenience and a bad example — but since they were seen as passive and apolitical, there was no reason to expend too much effort tracking them down.
In summary
From the beginning of 1944, public attitudes toward Forest Brothers became increasingly ambivalent. In Petseri County — home to a predominantly Russian-speaking population and the highest number of draft evaders — this sentiment largely reflected the broader mood among local residents. Elsewhere in Estonia, one could find more understanding toward Forest Brothers, but especially in rural village communities, draft evasion was not always looked upon kindly — particularly in areas where most households had someone serving in the military.
It's also worth remembering that efforts to apprehend evaders were largely carried out by local men through the home guard, which inevitably created added tensions between those doing the pursuing and those in hiding.
Thus, in rural areas, the general attitude toward these so-called "rabbit battalion men" was not so much hostile as tinged with a certain disdain. Their actions were often seen as lacking any clear purpose — or worse, interpreted as quietly waiting for the Red Army to arrive and rescue them from a directionless life in the forest.
From this perspective, they could be lumped together — at least symbolically — with Soviet partisans and saboteurs. The latter, however, were viewed with outright hostility by the public until the end of the German occupation.
In hindsight, it's clear that the wartime Forest Brothers had little impact — either positive or negative — on the course of events under German occupation. Their actions (or inaction) were driven more by a centuries-old tradition of evading authority and war than by any organized resistance effort.
When one hears claims that these men weren't "real" Forest Brothers, one might expect better arguments than their supposed apolitical stance, lack of clear objectives or limited activity. Evading service in an occupying army was certainly not an apolitical act. The idea that all Forest Brothers had a clear goal in mind — whether during the Summer War of 1941 or the postwar period — is more wishful thinking than historical fact. Alongside those who actively fought in 1941, there were also many passive hiders, and by the postwar years, they made up the majority. So it's unfair to criticize the wartime Forest Brothers of the German era for something that became the norm later.
What deserves to be emphasized here is the continuity of the Forest Brother Movement — regardless of the occupying power. It's worth returning briefly to the quote from Aleksander Resev in the introduction. A closer reading of that report reveals that some of the individuals it describes had hidden themselves during both the German and Soviet occupations. Later, some of them formed the core of the most serious resistance organization, the Armed Struggle Union, led by Endel Redlich. To label these men as apolitical "cowardly survivalists" is, in any case, entirely inappropriate.
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Editor: Marcus Turovski








