When Poirot steps onto the screen, viewers settle into their seats. Of course, by the time the detective arrives, someone is usually already lying flat and stiff — in other words, it's already too late in a way. Yesterday, we learned that the Ministry of the Interior wants to make the acquisition and continuous monitoring of terrorist propaganda punishable, with the aim of preventing tragic incidents.

The ministry's plans were followed by a flurry of expert feedback and now it's our job to ask what we should do with that insight. In the studio with us is Ministry of the Interior adviser Jüri Vlassov. Good morning! Just to make the goal clear for the public once again: you want to identify people who are under a dangerous influence and might start causing serious trouble.

To put it precisely, we're seeking an additional tool to influence people who have already become radicalized and pose a threat to society.

Already have? So this isn't about preventing them from changing, but rather that you're able to categorize them as dangerous?

Yes, that's the basis of our proposed legal amendment.

And to do that, you're monitoring internet traffic, attending gatherings and so on?

We at the Ministry of the Interior don't do that ourselves. We propose legal changes and consider how to make the Republic of Estonia safer through legislation. However, counterterrorism is the task of the Internal Security Service (ISS) and they've been doing that for quite a long time — successfully, one could say. They've also found that they need this kind of tool and that's what we're proposing.

That was one of the questions raised by legal experts yesterday — so that must mean the ISS currently can't do certain things?

We're currently in a situation where, if the ISS identifies someone as radicalized and dangerous during the course of their work, then from a criminal law perspective, nothing can really be done until that person commits an act of terror — when someone is already down and stiff, so to speak. What we want is to be able to act sooner, in cases where the ISS already knows someone is radicalized and dangerous. Then there would also be legal grounds to intervene.

So someone is deemed dangerous even though they haven't done anything yet — but they seem dangerous?

The person has to have done something — expressed themselves in a way that allows that danger to be identified. Let me be clear: we are not advocating for a thought police or mass surveillance. Surveillance societies belong in books and different societal models — I wouldn't want to live in a country where those kinds of things happen, even though some of the feedback we've seen suggests otherwise.

So the ISS currently isn't allowed to take action at that point?

Correct — there are currently no criminal law tools to intervene with such individuals.

Let's take real-life examples. On the Delfi news portal, there's growing attention on a middle-aged Russian man named Gennadi and his red-haired companion. They came from Ukraine, have reportedly been living here for seven years and say they want Putin to come here and for Estonians to be shot. Would you consider this a case of missed radicalization and terrorism?

I wouldn't use the term "missed," but it does seem like a case where someone is expressing a radicalized mindset. In my view, it would be logical for law enforcement agencies to take a closer look at that.

But that essentially means no agency can do anything yet, because no one's actually been shot?

Yes, that's what I was trying to explain — there aren't many criminal law tools available right now. However, since we're talking here about pro-Russian radicalization, Estonia already has criminal law measures in place for that — covering things like war propaganda, displaying war symbols and related activities.

The difference lies in the fact that while terrorism is traditionally defined as actions by non-state actors — such as individuals or terrorist organizations — aimed at causing political change, pro-Kremlin radicalization or propaganda is a case of one state acting against another. That's a subtle but important distinction.

So does this also mean that if Gennadi had instead threatened to kill all Christians and identified as a follower of Islam, we'd already have a problem?

The problem exists in both scenarios, but yes — if that were the case, it would indeed be classified differently. Then we'd definitely have a problem.

Let's look at examples from America. Yesterday's news was more than "fruitful." The latest reports out of the U.S. suggest a politically motivated murder — of Charlie Kirk. In your view, is this terrorism?

First of all, it's not for me to assess — that's up to U.S. authorities. It doesn't relate to the legislation we're proposing in Estonia; it's a matter of American law. That said, it is an example of how political ideology can lead to violent crime. We'll have to wait and see what the investigation reveals — so far, we only have assumptions.

In Estonia, thankfully, we don't have much in the way of Islamist crime. But every day online, we see people threatening to shoot someone or do something else. Maybe that's a bit of an exaggeration, but we know the attitudes that have emerged and we know where the real problem lies.

We've talked about terrorism — agreed that legislation exists to address pro-Russian cases and we've touched on Islamist threats. But now let's talk about what's actually happening here in Estonia: some people are already quite radicalized in their words. Is the ISS limited in what it can do in these cases?

I'd say that what's happening in Estonia is well-documented in the ISS's annual reports and in court cases. We've seen examples on both sides. It started in 2013 with the case of (Ivan – ed.) Sazanakov, who had become radicalized through Islamist ideology, and his supporters who served prison time.

But the most recent case involved right-wing extremism, where young people were convicted for actions stemming from that ideology. So we face this problem in both directions, and when something needs to be investigated, I'm confident our law enforcement agencies will do so.

According to the proposal, it would become punishable to knowingly and repeatedly view, disseminate or acquire terrorist propaganda, unless it's done for educational, artistic or scientific purposes. Who decides where those lines are drawn?

Again, the aim of this proposed law is to deal with people who have already been identified by security services as radicalized and dangerous. It's about having additional tools to influence them. That's what we're trying to achieve — not starting from the other end, as many commentators seem to think.

So first comes the phase where someone has already been deemed dangerous and this bill addresses what happens next — not how someone gets labeled in the first place?

Exactly. And that assessment of danger is made in the day-to-day work of the ISS, which is responsible for counterterrorism in Estonia.

Center Party MP Anastassia Kovalenko-Kõlvart said that in order to enforce this law, a total surveillance system would have to be activated. She noted that our current laws already have clear provisions for threats. So why do we need a new provision, especially when the explanatory memorandum states that Estonia currently has no terrorism-related crime problem?

It's true that we haven't had any terrorist crimes committed yet — that is, no violent terrorist acts. And we would very much like to keep it that way. Estonia is small enough that if the five potential cases we're estimating this amendment would cover turned into five buses blown up during rush hour or vehicles driven into crowds, the impact on society would be enormous.

Legal expert Paloma Krõõt Tupay asked how researchers or journalists studying Islamic terrorism would be affected. Would influencers or bloggers be allowed to visit such sites for research purposes?

Of course they would. Again, the law is intended to be a tool for dealing with people who are already radicalized and dangerous. That's why the proposal includes exemptions for journalistic, educational and other legitimate purposes.

Even journalism itself is struggling to define who counts as a journalist, who represents the media, who's an influencer and who falls somewhere in between — but you seem to know exactly.

I'd say that's more a question for journalistic regulators. It's not about whether I know who a journalist is, but that the exemptions are clearly written into the proposal. What matters is the person's mindset and intent — that's also included in the draft.

So if someone is already a fanatic and maybe dangerous but hides behind the label of "journalist," then you still know what you're dealing with?

That's something an investigation would have to determine. That's what investigations are for — to establish what's really going on and whether it meets the legal criteria for a crime.

In your view, did none of the experts who spoke out yesterday raise any important points?

Experts are supposed to give their assessments and opinions, and assuming they've thoroughly read the proposal, those views are valuable and necessary. That's exactly why we presented the draft publicly — because we want feedback and public debate.

So tell us — what feedback was valuable and necessary?

Again, as we go through the process of reviewing this draft, we'll evaluate all the feedback and consider how it affects the legislative process.

But none of yesterday's comments are part of that evaluation?

I'm not saying yes or no. They were all valuable and interesting perspectives.

So if legal scholar Carri Ginter continues to take an interest in a channel like Russia Today, that doesn't mean he'll end up on a terrorist watch list?

Of course it doesn't.

But at some point, could that risk arise?

I imagine that if he were to become radicalized and wanted to carry out violence against others because of his beliefs, then yes, it would become a problem.

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