The report makes some very harsh statements about the Ministry of Defense and how you have handled money there. Will anyone be held accountable?

We've started an extraordinary audit, which focuses for example on advance payments. Defense procurement — and defense ministries in general — cannot function without advance payments. But if advance payments end up just sitting somewhere, there must be oversight. So we're carrying out an extraordinary inventory, which is already underway.

In the coming weeks, I will receive an overview of the state of these advance payments, the reasoning behind them and whether they were justified. Based on that, we'll decide what to change and what to do differently.

This is not the first or biggest scandal in the Ministry of Defense's area of governance. You have promised improvements, but they haven't been delivered — something the National Audit Office also pointed out in its audit.

The growth in defense spending means greater responsibility — not only to taxpayers, but also in terms of transparency and making smart use of the money.

We have in fact taken steps to strengthen our financial management earlier this year. With a structural change, we strengthened the audit function, which coordinates audits across the ministry's entire area of administration. We also established a new security and internal control department. That department is now staffed, operating, and its goal is precisely to strengthen the internal control function that the National Audit Office referred to when assessing last year's situation. These steps have been taken.

Let me give one example: a supplier was mistakenly given an advance payment. The question is, how can a mistaken advance payment of €80 million even happen? Then that supplier returned €47.8 million, but kept $40 million, to be used for a future deal with the Estonian state. That is essentially giving an interest-free loan to a private company.

We accept the mistake. That money has already been used — the weapons systems are in Estonia, operational and have even been shown on "Aktuaalne kaamera" demonstrating how they work. They work well.

Of course, such mistakes are unacceptable. We need to improve communication between the Defense Investments Center (RKIK) and the State Shared Service Center. That's also where the strengthened internal control function comes in. But the weapons systems are here.

Why wasn't the money reclaimed? The gap between the scheduled payments and that particular transfer was actually short. The payments have now been made and the weapons systems are in Estonia.

Was Magnus Saar's departure as head of the Defense Investments Center connected to these financial management issues?

Not directly. The initiative to step down came from him.

What happens next? You're facing heavy criticism. Do you feel personally responsible?

Absolutely. Together with the leadership of the Ministry of Defense, the Defense Forces and the defense investments team, we take the National Audit Office's remarks very seriously.

Since the school year just started, I'll use a schoolwork analogy: you have an exercise book, and all the assignments in it must be completed. If the work comes back marked up in red pen, then you need to make corrections.

We've already started making improvements — the structural reform I mentioned earlier. And I can only promise that we will continue building Estonia's defense capability, managing all entrusted resources responsibly. That's the foundation of everything.

We live in difficult times, and taxpayers are putting huge amounts of money into defending Estonia. Taxpayers may wonder if you're truly capable of managing the very large sums planned for defense in the coming years. Do you have enough people, and so on?

We can handle the growth in the budget, and we can handle building defense capability. We have already made changes and will continue to do so.

At the Defense Investments Center, we also need to bring in more people. We have already hired some and restructured as well, to make sure investments are used as efficiently as possible and directed where they need to go.

How big is the role of political responsibility for the defense minister in this?

This is one team, working together across the whole sector. I see it as shared responsibility — collective responsibility. The National Audit Office is right to point out that none of this is news today.

We have worked with the National Audit Office, and we will do even better going forward. We promise to be a better partner, ensuring all the documents, reports and overviews they need reach them. There is no reason they should not have access to our oversight materials.

Have there been problems with that before?

Yes, there have. We assumed it was enough to forward, for example, just standard contracts. But the principle of "don't assume, verify" is the correct one. Going forward, we'll do better and provide documents retroactively as needed. There's no reason we shouldn't share everything we have and they require.

--

Follow ERR News on Facebook and X and never miss an update!