"Our current capability is limited to sending a warship to a given area, but it lacks cutting-edge technology to detect underwater activities and acts of sabotage," Jaanus Rahumägi told ERR. "This is not just about identifying damage caused by an anchor dragging over a cable but about detecting organized, well-prepared sabotage, which is very difficult to identify without state-of-the-art technology. Estonia currently does not have such technology. Acquiring it must be a priority for the country."

"There are two options," Rahumägi continued. "Either the state creates a modern unit within the Navy or it outsources the task. In the latter case, private companies that own these cables and pipelines would be responsible for their security, gathering information and monitoring the situation. The Navy would then respond to potential acts of sabotage, as it holds the authority to use force."

"This requires serious consideration for the future. We proposed that Estonia acquire such capabilities back when both Nord Stream pipelines were blown up. For Estonia, this is an entirely new issue. Traditionally, Estonians avoid taking action until it becomes absolutely necessary. However, by that point, it is often too late. I don't believe it is too late today, but I do think this is the last moment to start addressing the issue," Rahumägi warned. "Recent events suggest a new global phenomenon, a wave of deliberate cable cuts. These incidents appear to be testing the limits and readiness of Western allies to respond."

Rahumägi stressed that failure to act would have significant consequences. "If Estonia does nothing, it will affect public morale and send a clear signal to both the Russians and the Chinese," he said. "It would imply to those attempting to challenge the global order of the past 70 to 80 years that the rules no longer apply and everything has changed. If Estonia does not adapt to these changes, we risk being left behind as mere followers."

Rahumägi critical of dispatching patrol boat to the area

According to Rahumägi, protecting underwater infrastructure should be handled without excessive fanfare or political rhetoric.

"Today I read news that Estonia launched some operation and sent a ship somewhere. Initiating such high-profile operations without deeper substance only invites the Russians, or anyone else, to prove a point by showing that, despite your ship being stationed over the cable, they can still act underwater undetected and compromise your cable," Rahumägi said in response to the news that the Estonian Defense Forces had deployed the patrol vessel Raju to safeguard the Estlink 1 cable.

"The time for political slogans should be over for good. Instead, Estonia must take concrete, well-considered steps that encompass technological, legal and political dimensions," Rahumägi emphasized.

Noise from an anchor dropping can be identified

To detect and prevent potential sabotage, Rahumägi emphasized the need for underwater monitoring capabilities.

"Currently, when ships typically lower their anchor chains with anchors, it creates very noticeable noise underwater. If such noise is detected, it is possible to deploy underwater drones to monitor the situation. Naturally, the scale of this isn't massive, as we know where the cables are located, and the depths involved aren't very significant. This process shouldn't be overly complex given today's technological capabilities," Rahumägi explained.

Once the source of the noise is identified, Rahumägi noted that responses could include blocking the vessel's route.

"In terms of response capabilities, NATO members must reach agreements among themselves. International maritime law plays a significant role here. However, if underwater monitoring can provide court-admissible evidence that it was an act of sabotage, it is possible, even under current laws, to respond decisively in international waters," Rahumägi said.

ERR asked whether implementing resources to continuously detect anchors dropping to the seabed might be too costly for countries surrounding the Gulf of Finland and whether it is realistic.

"I've read in the media that repairing a cable can cost €30 to €40 million, plus additional costs related to energy distribution disruptions, morale issues or other factors. Monitoring is, in any case, cheaper than dealing with these consequences later. Financially, monitoring might cost a third, at most, of what cable repairs or related expenses would require," Rahumägi replied.

"A professionally executed deterrence strategy, carried out with modern methods, should be the primary argument for preventing such incidents. Of course, this requires thoughtful and deliberate action," he added.

Finland in an entirely different weight category

Rahumägi noted that Finland has significantly greater capabilities to respond to such incidents compared to Estonia.

"Estonia and Finland operate in entirely different weight categories. This is because Finland's Navy has, since the Cold War, taken into account Russian submarines and various provocations by Russia, such as those that have occurred along the Swedish coast," Rahumägi said.

He added that Finns typically do not disclose details about their underwater technologies or operations related to these activities.

"It can only be assumed that Finland has developed quite advanced technology, which they can likely use not only for coastal defense but also to protect cables and pipelines, something they are probably actively considering today. Considering that the Finns intercepted a Russian ship to question its crew, it is likely they had sufficient grounds to do so without violating international law. However, Finland does not reveal the technologies they employ," Rahumägi explained.

On Wednesday, the EstLink 2 direct current connection between Estonia and Finland was disabled due to an outage. According to preliminary findings by the Finnish National Bureau of Investigation, the EstLink 2 cable was likely damaged by the anchor of the Russian oil tanker Eagle S, which is reportedly part of Russia's shadow fleet. The anchor was not recovered during the vessel's detention.

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