In Raik's opinion, the war, now entering its third year, has served to bring Ukraine into the camp of the Western countries, bringing about a sort of self-fulfilling prophecy for Russia, in the process.

Interviewer: I suppose it could be stated that, in the wake of the opening of Russia's full-scale military activities in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, Western countries have concentrated their minds, and a far more critical attitude towards Russia has been taken than was the case earlier?

Raik: Well, that is for certain. This has been especially clear in Europe; the war was a major shock for many Western Europeans. Maybe we here had expected it more, so were not quite so stunned and were not required to start reevaluating our foreign and security policies, and could press on with the same policies we had before. These policies simply have far more credibility now than they had done before.

However, in countries like Germany and France, the attitude towards Russia really did undergo a reassessment: They did not expect that Russia would initiated a full-scale war and that it would really turn out to be such a major threat to Europe's security. I think now they appreciate things quite similarly to the way we do.

For instance, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced the defense fund worth €100 billion right after the start of the war , yet in reality its implementation has been very slow, while European military support for Ukraine more generally has certainly moved forward in very small increments.

Sadly, it seems that new wake-up calls are required all the time, in order to prompt a reminder of how intimidating Russia definitely is and the danger this war presents to Europe. These shocks have come from both West and East, lately.

But these shocks have now led to changes both in NATO, where finally our defense plans are actually ready, plus of course major changes have taken place within the EU as well?

Certainly, there have been plenty of concrete changes and it is also remarkable to what extent Estonia has pushed behind these important decisions; the extent to which Estonia has been visible.

2022 in particular was a year in which Estonia's international visibility and influence had been greater than ever before in history. It had already fallen somewhat last year, however. Last year, other things started to come up and so the attention became a little diluted.

That said, the comprehension of what all this means and what needs to be done in order to shore up European security in a situation like this, has emerged only gradually. The steps have come very slowly.

However, if we look specifically at how the EU and NATO and the organizations' member states have reacted, we have seen been sanctions packages in which they have constantly tried to find new ways to raise the stakes for Russia in continuing with its war.

One major concern is how to mitigate Russia's chances of circumventing these sanctions, as there are many countries in the world that have not joined them. These are primarily Western sanctions, so it cannot be said that Russia is isolated globally speaking.

And, of course, military support for Ukraine, where Estonia has been a leader – even before the full-scale attack, Estonia was one of the few countries that provided military aid to Ukraine. Here, we have had to push back all the time, and it has been very important to do this work in the EU as well. For example, the initiative of one million projectiles, which now will not succeed according to the original plan, that one million shells would be [supplied] to Ukraine in a year (by March – ed.), but this will probably be completed by the end of the year.

I would say that it is even more important due to the principle that the EU is doing something along these lines, via joint procurement. This is unprecedented, and that Estonia has initiated it is all the more remarkable.

Ultimately, however, these one million shells are not enough, since if we look at Ukraine's needs, these go far beyond that, and in any case, Ukraine needs to get these projectiles from elsewhere too; we are working on that.

Additionally is the issue of strengthening Europe's defense industry, which again has turned out to be frustratingly slow, given the war has now been going on for two years, yet still not really much has been done.

Concrete decisions have now started to be made, but it will all take several years before the new production lines can get going and before anything really starts to roll of them. But all these things are ongoing; the work is ongoing.

The use of frozen Russian assets is also now very much on the agenda – including how can we find a legal solution here. Again, Estonia can be a trailblazer. Legislation has already been prepared in Estonia, and will hopefully get adopted soon. There is a lot of interest in this solution, as it is legally very complicated to enact. Our hope is that other countries will also follow suit, since morally and politically speaking, everyone understands that it is needed; the differences of opinion are on how to actually do it.

Could you also say what the biggest event or decision that has transpired in the West in the course of this war is? Can you even name a few areas?

To narrow it down to one thing is perhaps difficult to do. But the consensus is that Russia is currently the biggest threat to European security – and this is actually a new phenomenon. That Ukraine must be integrated into the EU is also a new idea.

There are more question marks in relation to Ukraine and NATO, but certainly the fact remains that Ukraine is an integral part of the West and so must be integrated into Western structures in order to have security and stability in Europe in the future. And this is a completely new thing, there was no such common understanding on this before. There were some Eastern flank nations, and maybe the UK too, who thought that Ukraine should be able to join the EU and NATO, but many nations opposed it.

Within the EU, there was most likely a debate recently about whether to recognize Ukraine as a European country at all, in order to give it a basis for even prospective membership?

This was indeed debated, endlessly, ie. whether Ukraine can even be permitted to have the prospect of joining. These disputes are now over, however. Naturally it will take a long time until Ukraine can in reality join the EU. Again, there are more question marks over NATO, because the US does not really want to move forward with this topic right now, meaning most likely no major progress can be expected from the NATO summit in Washington in summer.

Be that as it may, making statements that Ukraine is a part of the West and that this is our goal remains a really big deal. Beyond that, there had still been a bit of an attitude in the West - though it was not stated so directly, but was nonetheless the feeling - that Ukraine surely belongs within Russia's sphere of influence.

Of course, no one in the West uses the term sphere of influence in such a way that that would legitimize this, but, de facto they were not ready to take Ukraine into either the EU or NATO. Plus actions showed that the West seemed to accept that Russia has some kind of prerogative to somehow control Ukraine's position, and developments inside Ukraine. All that has now changed.

All these changes that you outlined have in actuality taken place more at governmental and leadership level, surely. But might it be said that Western societies have also altered in some respects, following the outbreak of war?

The fact that war has returned to Europe once again, that a conflict on such a scale is going on, has shaken people up, more so, of course, in those countries that are closer geographic proximity to Russia and Ukraine. In more distant countries such as Spain and Portugal, society may not feel that this is a matter so close to them.

Ultimately, in the post-Cold War era, it was considered virtually impossible, or at least extremely unlikely, that something like this could ever transpire again in Europe.

Granted, there were the wars in the former Yugoslavia, in the 1990s, but they were more localized conflicts. Now we are surely talking about the wider threat of war. There is a war in Ukraine right now, but there is also this awareness that there is the possibility of it spreading from there to other places as well, especially if Russia were to emerge victorious. This represents a deeply radical shift in the security picture.

At the same time, those countries that are Russia's neighbors have always been aware that they must be prepared for the possibility that, one day, Russia will go on the offensive. Not that it was a near-term future perspective, but the possibility was never totally forgotten. However in the Western countries, this was not at all something that people would have thought about, or considered viable.

Up to now we have mainly been talking about Europe, but can major changes be highlighted globally too?

Globally speaking this is difficult to evaluate. Perhaps at the very start of the war, it seemed that there were plenty of countries which supported the UN statements on the issue and stood in condemnation of Russia's aggression, but by now we are certainly see that it is specifically the Western countries that support Ukraine – in Europe, the US, perhaps Japan, Australia, and some other, like-minded countries.

At the same time, there are many countries in the world who do not want to pick a side in this war. Instead, they are pursuing their own interests, so all this talk about a rules-based world order that we are defending in Ukraine is not credible from their point of view.

They perceive that this has not worked in their interests, at least as it could or should, that this has all been a Western enterprise, a world order designed to serve the interests of the West.

India, for instance, is a good example of a country that is a democracy, even with certain concessions, and an important partner for the US, but which at the same time plays its own game. They still foster key relations with Russia, and so they are not choosing sides in this war. They are trying to profit economically from the fact that this situation is as it is.

The attitude is we don't know how this war will end up, so perhaps it's not recommended to choose a side.

While for Western countries, especially for European nations, the picture is a black and white one, whereby if Russia were to go to war, then it is clear that the consequences for us would be very negative, but in other parts of the world this is perceived differently.

I was just recently at an India-Pacific region conference in Brussels, where the only country that clearly agrees with our line was Japan, and the rest clearly held different views. Yes, there was some common understanding that it is necessary for the rules of international security to remain in place and there is an agreement that Russia has violated these, but in reality these countries are still not ready to pay any price in stopping Russia or supporting Ukraine, and so are not adopting a very clear position.

In addition, the US' global role has also diminished, something which has been a long-term process. Whereas after the end of the Cold War we saw an era of US hegemony, which had no serious competitors, this has gradually changed. Of course, the US remains the most powerful country in the world in many ways, but this influence has waned. Nonetheless, the West is perhaps more united now than it was before the Ukrainian war, yet in relative terms it is weaker than was the case even 10-20 years ago.

The role of China is very important. China still de facto backs Russia, even though they do not say so directly and are very cautious about their support. But economically and politically, China has certainly supported Russia, a lot. It is not in China's interest for Russia to lose this war.

Let's turn back to the West. Under what conditions could the scenario ever be one of an undoing, a return to business as usual in relations with Russia? Is this even possible?

At the moment, there is no way to see that this can happen, and I think that as long as Putin is in power, it will definitely not happen.

Even if such readiness or the question alone were somewhere in the air all the time and in the behind-the-scenes discussions on whether to negotiate with Russia, followed by the normalization of relations with Putin, I don't think anyone really considers that viable.

What is hard to predict is that if one day Putin's rule ends and someone of more technocratic bent takes his place, a type of (current Prime Minister Mikhail) Mishustin figure, one who seems to be more open to cooperation and represents some new attitude that what the West is. I think then the Western countries might want to give Russia a chance to try to restore relations, in such a case.

Not that this would spell a return to the situation that existed before the war or before the annexation of Crimea, but the desire to restore relations has not been forgotten or buried anywhere. There is still the hope that we will get there, one day.

This is also a dangerous moment for Russia's neighboring countries, so we don't take steps that would weaken our security, just for the sake of being able to start normalizing relations with Russia again.

At the end of the day, this is all speculation right now. After all, it could also turn out that the next regime after Putin will be at least as bad.

Currently, Russia then, is definitely seen as a long-term threat to European security. And I think this understanding is now quite strong, across Europe.

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